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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the impact of agglomeration externalities on hourly earnings using 
longitudinal worker micro-level data from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings over the 
period 2002- 2006. We find that the effect of agglomeration externalities on wages is 
sensitive to the estimator used. Controlling for nonzero correlation between workers’ 
unobservable skills and other covariates halves the size of the wage elasticity of 
agglomeration externalities. On the contrary, accounting for firms’ unobservable 
heterogeneity has only a weak contribution to the explanation of wage differentials. Another 
interesting result is that correcting for reverse causality between productivity and 
agglomeration does not appear to have a substantial impact on the magnitude of the 
parameter estimates. Our best estimate for the effect of labour market density (market 
potential) is 0.8% (5.8%). This means that doubling labour market’s employment density can 
raise hourly earnings by nearly 1%, while halving the distances to other markets produces an 
increase of hourly wages of nearly 3%. The last piece of evidence refers to the spatial 
attenuation of agglomeration externalities. We estimate that a 100,000 increase in the number 
of jobs within 5 kilometres raises hourly wages by approximately 1.19%; the effect falls 
sharply thereafter. 
 
Keywords: Agglomeration externalities, wages, endogeneity, sorting. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In this paper we look at individual hourly wage rates to investigate the importance of agglomeration 
economies. We ask four questions. The first question relates to the degree to which spatial wage 
disparities result from agglomeration externalities: we test for the effect of labour market scale and 
access to product markets on workers’ hourly earnings. The second question concerns the 
sensitiveness of the effects from agglomeration externalities to both workers’ and firms’ unobservable 
heterogeneity. Thirdly, we are also interested in the extent to which correcting for reverse causality 
between earnings and agglomeration affects the magnitude of the wage elasticities of agglomeration 
externalities. Finally, we ask whether agglomeration externalities decay with increasing distance, and 
investigate the spatial scale over which its effects are likely to operate. It is worth mentioning that our 
regression analyses contemplate the whole aggregate economy as well as various industry groups.  
The first question is addressed through a regression of individual worker wages on a set of 
variables that proxy for agglomeration externalities, controlling for time-varying worker 
characteristics and other factors that influence wages. The initial results for the effect of labour market 
scale and market potential indicate that doubling the employment density of a given labour market 
raises hourly wages by about 2.2%, whereas doubling the market potential of a given labour market 
increases hourly wages of around 10.0%.  
To evaluate the impact of workers’ and firms’ unobservable heterogeneity on the parameter 
estimates for agglomeration externalities, we use a linear fixed-effects model that accounts for both 
worker- and firm-specific heterogeneity. Controlling for workers unobservable heterogeneity halves 
the size of the effects from labour market scale and market potential to 1.0% and 5.4% respectively. In 
contrast, further accounting for firm level unobservable heterogeneity has only a very weak impact on 
the estimates: the wage elasticity of employment density (market potential) further reduces to 0.72% 
(5.1%). Another interesting finding is that correcting for the endogeneity between earnings and 
agglomeration through instrumental variables estimators appears to affect the magnitude of 
agglomeration externalities only slightly: the preferred elasticity of employment density (market 
potential) is approximately 0.8% (5.8%).  
 Finally, to address the fourth question we examine the spatial attenuation of agglomeration 
externalities by testing for the effect of proximity to jobs in concentric distance bands around the 
centroid of worker’s workplace. We find that a 100,000 increase in the number of jobs within 5 
kilometres raises hourly wages by approximately 1.19%; this effect falls sharply (0.38%) if the 
increase in the number of jobs occurs 10 kilometres away, and remains around 0.15% if the increase in 
the number of jobs occurs between 10 to 20 kilometres.  
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 This paper attempts to contribute to the empirical literature in several ways. Previous studies 
have generally paid scant attention to the importance of workers’ unobservable skills. Our analysis 
considers the role of both workers’ and firms’ unobservable heterogeneity. We also provide evidence 
on the spatial sorting of more able workers across space. Another contribution from our work is that it 
provides further evidence on the nature and magnitude of the endogeneity bias from reverse causality 
between productivity and agglomeration economies not only for the aggregate economy but also for a 
comprehensive set of economic sectors. Finally, we add to the empirical literature by generating new 
evidence on the spatial decay and scope agglomeration externalities.  
 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly summarises the main results and 
characteristics of the empirical research on the effects of agglomeration economies on productivity 
through estimation of wage models. The theoretical framework and econometric estimation are 
described in section 3. Section 4 describes the data and variables used in our analysis. Section 5 
discusses the results of our estimations and section 6 provides some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Overview of previous empirical evidence 
 
There is general agreement on positive effects from agglomeration externalities but magnitudes can 
differ quite substantially both within and between studies (see Rosenthal and Strange, 2004 for a 
descriptive review of the empirical literature; and Melo et al., 2009 for a meta-analysis of the 
empirical literature). Although the empirical evidence is mostly produced by the agglomeration 
literature within the field of regional and urban economics, other strands of literature have contributed 
with estimates for the productivity benefits from agglomeration economies (e.g. labour economics 
with estimates of the “urban wage premium” from Mincerian wage models augmented with measures 
of agglomeration economies).  
 Studies generally build on one or several alternative theories for the observation of spatial 
differences in workers’ productivity levels and wages. For the purpose of our analysis, the theory we 
wish to test for is that workers are paid more in large and denser markets because they are more 
productive there due to the presence of agglomeration economies. From the point of view of 
individual firms, the relevant question is why they prefer to be located in areas where input costs are 
higher. The theory of agglomeration economies answers that it is because firms enjoy efficiency gains 
from more productive workers. Alternative theories propose that larger urban areas pay higher wages 
because they attract more skilled workers. If more able workers self-select into more productive 
markets, then part of the effect from urban agglomeration externalities is due to workers unobserved 
skills: the “omitted ability bias” problem, which reflects a process of spatial self-selection into more 
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educated and more productive areas (see Glaeser and Mare, 2001; Wheeler, 2001; Yankow, 2006). 
There is also the hypothesis that workers are paid more because of knowledge spillovers in large and 
denser areas, which arise from externalities in learning and human capital investment (see Moretti, 
2004 for a recent survey of this literature). This theory is related to the agglomeration economies 
hypothesis because knowledge spillovers are one of the Marshallian mechanisms through which 
agglomeration economies arise (Rosenthal and Strange, 2006, p.18). 
 Table 1 provides a summary of previous evidence for the effect of urban agglomeration 
externalities on wages. The great majority of existing evidence is for the USA. Sveikauskas (1975) 
estimates that doubling the population of metropolitan areas in the USA causes earnings to raise 
between 1.2% to 8.6%. Segal (1976) estimates that income in the largest USA metropolitan areas 
(with two million or more inhabitants) is 8% higher than in the remaining metropolitan areas. Wheeler 
(2001) finds that USA metropolitan area population increases hourly wages by 2.7%. Glaeser and 
Mare (2001) find that earnings in dense (non-dense) USA metropolitan cities can be up to 28% (15%) 
higher than earnings in non-urban areas. Yankow (2006) reaches similar conclusions: earnings in USA 
big cities (small cities) can be up to 22% (10%) higher than in non-urban areas.  
Nevertheless, there is also some evidence for Europe. Evidence from regional level studies also 
proposes positive effects from agglomeration on regional economic performance. Fingleton (2003) 
and Fingleton (2006) estimate wage elasticities of employment density between 1.4% and 4.9% for 
Local Authority Districts (LAUD) in GB. Rice et al. (2006) estimate a wage elasticity with respect to 
economic mass of about 5% for GB NUTS3 regions. Evidence from worker level data suggest 
somewhat smaller elasticity values. Combes et al. (2008a,b) estimate that doubling employment 
density of French employment areas raises wages by between 2-3%. Mion and Naticchioni (2005) 
estimate smaller effects for Italian Provinces: doubling employment density raises wages by only 
0.22%. 
 The most common approach in the empirical literature has been to measure agglomeration 
economies with total population/employment or density. The main limitation of using measures of 
total size/density is their failure to tell something about the spatial distribution of the effects from 
agglomeration externalities. To overcome this gap, some of the more recent studies have experimented 
with “market potential” type measures that capture both the size of and the proximity to economic 
activity. Market potential measures allow for the effects of agglomeration externalities to be realised 
over space and diminish with increased distance. The standard definition of the market potential of 
location r can be written as follows: 
 
∑=
j
α
rjd
jemp
rMP ,                     (1) 
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where empj measures the economic size of area j, drj represents the spatial separation between any two 
locations r and j, and α is the spatial decay gradient. Most of these studies, however, tend to assume a 
one-unit distance decay parameter, implying that the effect from increasing distance is linear. Some 
studies include own-area size to obtain a full measure of agglomeration effects (e.g. Graham and Kim, 
2007), whereas others exclude own-area size to capture effects related to access to product markets 
(e.g. Mion and Naticchioni, 2005; Combes et al., 2008a; Combes et al., 2008b).  
Graham and Kim (2007) estimate an elasticity of wages with respect to market potential of 
0.84% for manufacturing; the values for individual industries range between -13.3% for the 
manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products and 14.3% for the manufacture of office 
machinery and computers. The average elasticity for the service sectors is about 3.97%, while the 
values for the disaggregated sectors range between -13% for the motion picture, video, radio, and 
television activities and 17.3% for the wholesale and retail trades activities. Combes et al. (2008a) and 
Combes et al. (2008b) suggest that doubling the size of a given employment area market potential 
increases wages by about 2.4% and 3.4% respectively. Mion and Naticchioni (2005) estimate an 
elasticity of wages with respect to market potential of similar size:3.19%.  
The more common alternative approach is to divide total market potential defined above into a 
set of consecutive distance bands (e.g. Di Addario and Patacchini, 2007; Rosenthal and Strange, 
2008). This method is attractive because it can inform on the spatial scale within which agglomeration 
externalities are likely to be significant and the relative importance of these effects across different 
distance intervals.  
 Rosenthal and Strange (2008) investigate the spatial reach of agglomeration externalities by 
regressing US worker wages on the total employment contained within concentric distance rings from 
workers’ place of work. They find that wages increase by 1.5% to 2.14% for an additional 100,000 
full-time workers within 5 miles (about 8 kilometres) from the workers’ place of work and fall sharply 
thereafter: 0.52% (5-25 miles/8-40 kilometres), 0.84% (25-50 miles/40-80 kilometres), and 0.20% 
(50-100 miles/80-160 kilometres). The elasticity of wages with respect to jobs within the first distance 
ring is between 0.031 and 0.047: doubling total employment within 5 miles increases wages by 3.1% 
to 4.7%.  
 Di Addario and Patacchini (2007) and Fu (2007) follow Rosenthal and Strange’s approach. Di 
Addario and Patacchini (2007) fit wage models based on worker level data for Italy and estimate that 
an increase of 100,000 inhabitants within 4 kilometres from workers’ residence raises wages by 0.1%-
0.2%, but the increase falls sharply thereafter. Moreover, the impact is found to be significant only up 
to 12 kilometres, which is less than the average radius of Italian local labour markets (14.7 
kilometres); this suggested to the authors that agglomeration economies are likely to occur within 
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local labour markets. Fu (2007) also uses individual level data from the 1990 Massachusetts Census to 
test for the spatial attenuation of human capital related externalities. The findings indicate that human 
capital externalities in cities exhibit a very localized pattern (generally within 6 miles/9.7 kilometres) 
and can decay sharply with increasing distance from workers’ location.  
Only very few papers estimate the decay gradient α (e.g. Rice et al., 2006; Amiti and Cameron, 
2007; and Graham et al., 2009). Graham et al. (2009a) is the only study that provides decay gradients 
for various industry sectors. 
Rice et al. (2006) investigate the spatial scope of agglomeration forces by using a measure of 
economic mass that considers access to population of working age within various driving time 
intervals. Using an exponential function, they estimate the rate of decay to be 1.37 (using an 
instrumental variables (IV) estimator) and 1.51 (using a nonlinear least squares estimator (NLS)). 
These values imply that moving the population of working age 30 (60) minutes further away decreases 
the impact of economic mass on productivity by about 75% (94%) and 78% (95%) respectively.  
They also consider the decay of the effect of economic mass on wages: the rates of decay 
estimated range between 1.20 and 1.41, which implies that moving the population of working age 30 
minutes further away decreases the impact of economic mass on average hourly earnings by 70% to 
76%. This means that an individual of working age between 60-70 minutes away captures only 24% to 
30% of the effects of economic mass on its average hourly wage, compared to an individual of 
working age within 30-40 minutes of driving time away.  
Graham et al. (2009a) estimate firm level production functions and obtain a decay gradient for 
the Great Britain economy of about 1.66. The decay gradient of the market potential measure differs 
across economic sectors; the value is higher for service industries and smaller for manufacturing. 
Business services and consumer services have a decay gradient of 1.75 and 1.82 respectively, whereas 
for manufacturing the value is 1.10. This supports a steeper spatial attenuation of agglomeration 
externalities for the service sectors, which are generally more dependent on urbanisation levels.   
Amiti and Cameron (2007) focus on the spatial attenuation of the agglomeration effects arising 
from access to suppliers and markets. They use NLS estimators and find that the distance-decay 
parameter for the supplier and market access, using an exponential function, is 1.79 and 2.81 
respectively. The findings indicate that only 10% of the benefits of supplier and market access extend 
beyond 129 and 82 kilometres. The benefits from market access are substantially more localized than 
those from supplier access, but comparing the distance parameters across years reveals that the market 
access externality appears to have become less localized over time (fall of the distance-decay 
parameter), whereas the supply access externality appears to have become more localized over time 
(increase of the distance-decay parameter). 
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 To summarise, the existing evidence generally suggests a localised geographic scope of 
agglomeration externalities. The findings on the geographic scope of agglomeration effects can differ 
depending on which particular mechanism is being considered. Studies looking at knowledge 
spillovers and human capital externalities tend to agree on a very short geographic scope, while 
studies looking at input sharing linkages find that the geographic scope for these interactions is much 
wider. Unfortunately, there is not enough evidence on the actual spatial attenuation of the effects from 
each mechanism that we can use to make definite conclusions.  
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Table 1: Evidence on the effect of agglomeration economies on wages 
Author(s) Measure of agglomeration Country Spatial unit Industry Estimates 
Lewis and Prescott (1974) Employment USA SMSAs M β=9.4%a 
Sveikauskas (1975) Population USA SMSAs M ε=1.2-8.6% 
Segal (1976) Population USA SMSAs E β=8%b 
Fogarty and Garofalo 
(1978) 
Population USA SMSAs E β=9.93%;β=9.24%b 
Moomaw (1981) Population USA SMSAs M;E ε=5.98%;2.68% 
Diamond and Simon (1990) Population USA Cities M/NM β=0.6-2.0%c 
Share population in metropolitan area E β=0.22-1.68%d 
Square of share of population in metropolitan area 
USA States 
 β=-1.74-(-0.08%d 
Share population in metropolitan area M β=-0.196-(-0.230)%d 
Carlino and Voith (1992) 
Square of share of population in metropolitan area 
USA States 
 β=-0.0004-(-0.001)%d 
Population M β=0.09 (in wij/wi:i-industry, j-
provice)c 
De Lucio et al. (1996)  
Share of population in large cities (>20,000) 
Spain Provinces 
 β=0.063/0.065 (in wij/wi:i-industry, 
j-provice)d 
Adserà (2000) MSA population USA States M;F;ND;D;E β=1.6%e 
Inside - employment M ε=76.4%;37.8% 
Inside - employment density  ε=-1.8%;ε=-0.9% 
Outside - Market Potential (employment)  ε=4.3%;ε=-6.8% 
Graham (2000) 
Outside - Market Potential (employment density) 
UK Counties 
 ε=-9.6%;ε=-5.8% 
Tabuchi and Yoshida 
(2000) 
Population of SMEA Japan Cities E ε=-7%;-12% for real wages;ε= 10% 
for nominal wages 
Wheeler (2001) Population USA SMSAs E ε=2.7%  
Dense metropolitan city (>500,000) vs. rural E β=2.6-28.2% Glaeser and Mare (2001) 
Nondense metropolitan city (<500,000) vs. rural 
USA SMSAs 
 β=7.0-15.3% 
Costa and Kahn (2001) Metropolitan area size USA SMSAs E ε=-0.2-9.1% 
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Table 1: Evidence on the effect of agglomeration economies on wages (continued) 
Author(s) Measure of agglomeration Country Spatial unit Industry Estimates 
Industry emp. specialisation (% SMA emp.) M ε=2.78% 
Industry emp. concentration (% national emp.)  ε=1.5% 
Occupation emp. specialisation (% SMA emp.)  ε=3.66% 
Wheaton and Lewis (2002) 
Occupation emp. concentration (% national emp.) 
USA SMSAs 
 ε=0.59% 
Fingleton (2003) Employment density GB LAUD E ε=1.58-1.76% 
Employment density E ε:0.22% Mion and Naticchioni 
(2005) Market potential 
Italy Provinces 
 ε:3.19% 
Rosenthal and Strange 
(2008) 
Employment in concentric distance rings from place of 
work 
USA Distance rings from 
WPUMA 
E ε=4.5%  
Population size (big city vs. non-urban) E β=-1.6-22% Yankow (2006) 
Population size (small city vs. non-urban) 
USA SMSAs 
 β=1.9-9.5% 
Population size E ε=0.002pp (from +1%) Wheeler (2006) 
Population density 
USA Labour markets 
(MA/NMC)  ε=0.003pp (from +1%) 
Employment density E ε=1.4-4.9% Fingleton (2006) 
Market potential 
GB LAUD 
 ε=3.9-5.8% 
Rice et al. (2006) Economic mass GB NUTS3 E(NA) ε=4.96% 
Di Addario and Patacchini 
(2007) 
Population size Italy Local labour markets E β=0.1%e 
Employment density E ε=3.0% Combes et al. (2008a) 
Market potential 
France Employment  areas 
 ε=2.4% 
Graham and Kim (2007) Effective density (straight-line distance) UK Wards M;S ε=0.84%;ε=3.97% 
Employment density E ε=2-4% Combes et al. (2008b) 
Market potential 
France Employment  areas 
 ε=2-5% 
a for an increase in employment of 1thousand, b if population in SMSA exceeds 2 million, c for an increase in population/employment of 1million, d for +1percentage point (pp) in the share of 
population, e for +100,000 residents/workers 
ε: elasticity, β: proportionate change, pp: percentage point 
E: Whole economy, M: Manufacturing, S: Services, ND: Non-durable goods, D: Durable goods, F: Financial services; NM: Non-manufacturing 
LAUD: Local Authority Districts, MA/NMC: Metropolitan Areas/Non-Metropolitan Counties, WPUMA: Work Public Use Micro Area, SMEA: Standard Metropolitan Employment Area, 
SMSA: Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area 
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3. Theoretical framework and econometric model 
 
3.1. The theoretical model 
 
In this section we present the theoretical basis on which we structure our econometric analysis. We 
draw upon standard economic theory to derive a wage model that allows testing for the importance of 
agglomeration economies. The theoretical model described below follows closely that used by 
Combes et al. (2008a). Suppose that the production of a firm located in region r, pertaining to industry 
sector s, and using as input factors labour lrs and other input factors krs can be represented by the 
equation below. 
 
µ1
rs
µ
rsrsrsrs k)l(sAy
−=  ,                              (2) 
 
where Ars is the total factor productivity and is defined in a Hicks-neutral form, and srs represents the 
relative efficiency of labour. If the price of output yrs is prs, the remuneration of labour is wrs and the 
cost of the other input factors is rrs, then, at the competitive equilibrium the price of the input factors 
should equal the value of their respective marginal products. These are the usual solutions from the 
firm profit maximisation strategy, where the profit function is given below. 
 
)krl(wk)l(sApπ rsrsrsrs
µ1
rs
µ
rsrsrsrsrs +−= − ,                           (3) 
 
The first order conditions are given by the following expressions: 
 
µ1
µ
rsrsrsrs
rs
rs
l
k
sAµpw
−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= ,                             (4) 
 
and 
µ
µ
rsrsrsrs
rs
rs
l
k
sAµ)p(1r
−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛−= ,                             (5) 
 
Rearranging the second equation in terms of krs/lrs and substituting it into the wage equation, we obtain 
the demand curve for labour below: 
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Apsµ)µ(1w ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛−= −− ,              (6) 
 
where the remuneration of labour is positively determined by the quality of the labour force, srs, (e.g. 
qualification, education and other skills), the output price, prs, and the technological efficiency of the 
local economy, Ars. On the other hand, the level of wages depends negatively on the cost of the other 
non-labour input factors, rrs. It is through these latter three terms that agglomeration and dispersion 
forces are realized. While the output and input prices, prs and rrs, capture the effects from “pecuniary 
externalities”, the local environmental efficiency, Ars captures the effects from “technological 
externalities”.1  
 In particular, the term Ars captures the effects from “technological externalities” that are 
usually described in terms of the Marshallian externalities: (1) labour market pooling externalities 
from access to a large pool of skilled workers; (2) input-output linkages from access to large final- and 
intermediate product markets; and (3) knowledge spillovers from more intensive sharing of 
information and ideas. Here we can only estimate the combined net overall effect of all three 
mechanisms: (prsArs/rrs1-µ)^(1/µ). 
 
3.2. The econometric model and estimation issues 
 
We use the theoretical framework outlined above to investigate the effect of agglomeration economies 
on labour productivity as measured by individual worker wage rates. The wage equation below 
expresses the theoretical model above into the empirical model to be estimated: 
 
itεt)s(i,σt)o(i,λtδt)f(i,φlnYαr(i)tZβitX0αitlnw ++++++++= )t,i(rω ,                        (7) 
 
where i identifies the worker, r identifies the region, s refers to the economic sector, o denotes the 
occupational group, and t specifies the time period. The dependent variable is the logarithm of real net 
hourly earnings, that is, the gross hourly earnings discounted of any overtime pay and adjusted for the 
price level using the Average Earnings Index (AEI) conducted by the ONS. The term Xit is a vector of 
individual worker characteristics commonly considered in labour economics, including worker’s age, 
age squared, gender, and whether the worker is full-time or part-time. The data available allows us to 
compute for each individual worker the respective home-to-work distance. This is potentially a 
                                                 
1 The main difference between the two types of externalities is that the former operate through prices, whereas the latter impact on the 
utility of workers and the production of firms through nonmarket interactions (Fujita and Thisse, (2002)). 
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valuable covariate because it captures the effect from some of worker’s characteristics that we do not 
observe (e.g. household type, residential preferences, etc.).  
Since we also have information about the size of the firm in which individual worker i works, 
we include the number of workers in the respective firm f: Yf(i,t). Zr(i)t denotes a vector containing the 
variables that measure the net overall effects from agglomeration externalities, which we describe in 
the next section.  
In addition to the explanatory variables described above, we add various sets of dummy 
variables to control for sources of heterogeneity that can lead to omitted variable bias and 
inconsistency of the model parameter estimates. To control for macro level changes in wage rates that 
are common to all individuals we include a time effect, δt. To account for differences in workers’ 
wages due to job heterogeneity, we also include indicator variables for occupational groups, λo(i,t); the 
inclusion of occupation dummies is important because the ASHE does not provide any direct measure 
of workers’ education. Similarly, we control for economic sector heterogeneity with a set of dummy 
variables for various industry groups, σs(i,t). Because nominal wage levels can also reflect spatial 
differences in the living cost, the price (and rent) of land, the degree of market competition, etc., we 
incorporate a set of regional controls, ωr(i,t). There are other sources of heterogeneity that can affect the 
consistency of the parameter estimates in the wage equation. Workers’ unobserved heterogeneity (i.e. 
differences in worker skills and years of education) is one potential source of inconsistency. Finally, εit 
is the residual error term assumed to be normally distributed while allowing for heteroskedasticity and 
clustering on individuals.  
 The estimation of the effects of agglomeration on productivity is subject to identification and 
specification problems. We are concerned with the possibility of inconsistent parameter estimates 
caused by endogenous regressors. In our analysis, this complication can arise from two main sources: 
(i) correlation between the measures of agglomeration, worker’s quality as captured by their 
occupations, and the error term; (ii) reverse causality between agglomeration economies and worker 
productivity on one hand, and between home-to-work distances and earnings on the other hand.  
 The justification for inconsistent parameter estimation in the former case is that workers with 
higher unobserved ability (captured in the error term) will tend to have better quality and higher pay 
occupations; similarly, workers with higher unobserved ability will tend to self-select into larger 
labour markets that are more productive. As a result, the parameter estimate for the effect of urban 
agglomeration on wages will be composed of its direct effect but also an indirect effect that percolates 
through the correlation between agglomeration and workers’ unobserved ability. The least squares 
estimator will therefore be both biased and inconsistent. Controlling for time-variant observable 
heterogeneity in labour force quality through inclusion of occupational dummy variables minimises 
problems of bias due to spatial sorting, but only partially. To control for endogeneity from self-
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selection of more skilled workers into more productive labour markets, we employ the within-groups 
fixed-effects estimator, as used by previous studies (e.g. Glaeser and Mare, 2001; Combes et al., 
2008a; Combes et al., 2008b).  
 The second main estimation issue we face is that of reverse causality between wages and 
agglomeration, and between wages and home-to-work commutes. Reverse causality between 
productivity and agglomeration exists because there is a positive feedback between the two: firms and 
workers migrate to higher productivity areas and this reinforces agglomeration. As a result, 
agglomeration economies improve economic performance and economic performance reinforces 
agglomeration, making the latter endogenous. Graham et al. (2009b) estimate panel data vector 
autoregressions to test for bi-directional causality between productivity and agglomeration and find 
that agglomeration economies do Granger cause productivity.  
The standard strategy implemented to correct for endogeneity consists of using some form of 
instrumentation technique. The most common approach is to use long-lagged values of population or 
population density to instrument contemporary values of agglomeration economies (e.g. Ciccone and 
Hall, 1996; Mion and Naticchioni, 2005; Rice et al., 2006; Combes et al., 2008a; Combes et al., 
2008b). The motivation for selecting these variables is that historical values of population are 
correlated with current levels of urban size but are uncorrelated with current levels of productivity. 
Whereas the relevance of these instruments can be convincingly good, there is no absolute confidence 
that the instruments will be exogenous.   
Land area and geological data (e.g. fraction of land covered by water, fraction of land 
underlain by sedimentary rock, fraction of land designated as seismic hazard, etc.) have also become 
popular instruments for agglomeration (e.g. Ciccone, 2002; Combes et al., 2008b; Rosenthal and 
Strange, 2008; Di Addario and Patacchini, 2007). The motivation here is that the current patterns of 
population densities are correlated to the underlying geological features of the various geographies, 
but such geological features are uncorrelated with contemporaneous productivity levels. Compared to 
the long-lagged demographic instruments, the relevance of geological data is less persuasive. On the 
other hand, geological instruments are more likely to fulfil the exogeneity condition.  
Despite the previous attempts to solve the problem, the evidence has not proven conclusive in 
explaining the direction and magnitude of the bias that might arise from the simultaneity bias. While 
some studies obtain instrumental variables estimates that are smaller than the respective least squares 
ones, others seem to find the exact opposite result. In addition, some authors conclude that if 
agglomeration does have an endogenous component it does not appear to induce a substantial bias in 
estimates. Finally, there is lack of evidence on the extent to which endogeneity may predominate in 
some industries more than in others. 
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In addition to reverse causality, there is also a case for reverse causality between wages and 
home-to-work distance because the demand for travel depends on income levels. The main idea is that 
workers are only prepared to commute longer distances if they are compensated with higher wages. 
The reverse argument is also true: higher wage workers commute longer distances, other things (type 
of job, industry, etc.) remaining the same, because the have stronger preference for space and other 
amenities that tend to be located away from their workplace location.2 
It is more difficult to find a valid instrument for home-to-work commuting distances, 
particularly one available at the worker level. To the best of our knowledge this has not been done in 
the context of estimation of agglomeration externalities on workers’ productivity. We discuss the 
instrumental variables strategy for home-to-work distances in section 5.2.  
 
4. Description of data and variables 
 
4.1. Data sources 
 
Our main data source is the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE), an employee level 
longitudinal survey conducted by the Office for National Statistics (ONS). The ASHE is mainly based 
on a 1% sample of National Insurance numbers (NINo) of employees on the Inland Revenue (IR) Pay-
As-You-Earn (PAYE) register in February, and other supplementary samples with the purpose of 
improving the coverage of the survey. Additional samples include the IR PAYE register in April and 
the Inter Departmental Business Register that includes businesses that are not registered for PAYE but 
are registered for VAT. These two additional samples allow for the inclusion of employees that either 
entered the job market or moved jobs between the time of selection (February) and the date of the 
survey (April), as well as employees that earn below the PAYE limit.3 4 
 The ASHE contains a rich set of individual information about workers. The main variables 
refer to workers earnings, number of hours worked, gender, age, occupation, industry, whether the 
worker is a part-timer or full-timer, whether earnings are affected by absence, whether the worker is 
paid an adult or trainee/junior rate, and various types of geographic boundaries that identify the home 
and workplace locations. Unfortunately, there is no direct measure of workers’ education levels or 
                                                 
2 The preference for space will also depend on workers’ characteristics (e.g.: age, household size, etc), regardless of wage levels. 
3 The sample is based on NINo ending with a specific pair of digits generated by a 1 in 100 random sample of all jobs registered in the 
PAYE scheme, so each employee has an equal probability of being selected. The data coming from the VAT-only sample is obtained 
according to a random sample of registered businesses. The key difference to the IR PAYE scheme is that all employees in a selected 
business are included in the sample. 
4 The ASHE replaced the New Earnings Survey (NES) in 2004.  The data pre-2004 was made consistent with the ASHE methodology by 
the ONS staff in order to ensure that the panel could be constructed. 
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qualifications. There are also some features related to the worker’s employer, but the only variable 
consistent over time is that reporting the number of employees working in the firm.5 One of the key 
advantages of micro level data is that it allows us to control for human capital attributes that determine 
wage levels, and which may be correlated with (work) location (e.g. years of education, occupation, 
and industry, etc). 
 The original dataset available contains 1,559,719 observations, covering the period from 1997 
to 2006. After performing a series of actions concerned with data cleaning and data transformations, 
which we summarise in the paragraphs below, the final dataset consists of an unbalanced panel of 
225,104 individuals (corresponding to 657,533 observations) over the 5 year period from 2002 to 
2006. On average, we observe each individual worker 2.92 times.  
The largest loss of data results from the inclusion of the home-to-work distances as one of the 
regressors in the wage equation. In order to calculate this measure we use the data for both home and 
workplace postcodes, which are only available from 2002 onwards. This essentially halves the size of 
our dataset. The remaining observations lost result mainly from cleaning the dataset of records for 
which there were either missing values or some form of misreport (e.g. negative wages, ages below 16 
years, etc.). In addition to the cleaning of the dataset from erroneous and missing records, we also 
excluded the observations referring to employees whose earnings were affected by loss of pay due to 
absence and employees paid at junior/trainee rates.  
Based on the Northings and Eastings of worker’s respective home and work postcodes we 
calculate home-to-work distances. There are outlier values for home-to-work distances: about 2.2% of 
the home-to-work distances are greater than 200 kilometres. The mean home-to-work distance is 
around 21 kilometres, and the percentiles 75, 90, and 95 are 16, 38, and 86 kilometres respectively. 
There are various possible explanations for such long commutes and we apply a series of checks and 
tests to assess the extent to which errors could be affecting our data. Some of the long commutes can 
simply result from misreported postcodes. Alternatively, there may be unrealistic long commutes 
because of differences in workers’ actual home address and the address in the register hold by the 
employer. Although many of the long commutes are likely to be some sort of error, others can actually 
be correct, particularly if they are associated with high wage earners who have top managerial and 
highly skilled professional occupations and do not commute daily, or work from home.  
To investigate the potential for errors in postcode records and hence unrealistically high 
commute lengths, we examine workers’ wage levels, occupation groups and industries simultaneously. 
We do not expect to find workers willing to commute long distances unless they are compensated with 
high wages. Inspection of the occupation group can also provide an indication of whether workers 
may only need to commute weekly and hence be able to live further away from their workplaces. After 
                                                 
5 The questionnaires are completed by the employers, presumably reducing the incidence of both misreported and underreported records. 
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inspection of the data we applied two thresholds to obtain what we think is a more representative and 
clean dataset. We dropped the observations for workers with commutes lengthier than 120 kilometres, 
earn wage rates below the percentile 90, and work on occupation groups that do not reflect skilled 
jobs. Secondly, we also dropped the records for workers with commutes longer than 100 kilometres 
who earn less than the average wage rate.  
The average home-to-work distance is 15 km and the percentiles 75, 90, and 95 are 14, 30, and 
51 kilometres respectively. These Figures compare well with other data for commuting distances in 
Great Britain. Benito and Oswald (2000) use the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and 
show that the average commuting distance of full-time workers in Great Britain is 13 
kilometres. Dent and Bond (2008) use data from the Census 2001 and show that the average 
commuting distance of full-time workers in Great Britain is also about 13 kilometres. 
 
4.2. Measuring agglomeration externalities 
 
To build measures for agglomeration economies we use data on yearly sectoral employment available 
from the Annual Business Inquiry (ABI) from 2002 to 2006. We use Travel-to-Work Areas (TTWAs) 
as the spatial unit of analysis because these are the best available approximations of self-contained 
labour markets; they are defined as regions where the proportion of people who live (work) in the area 
is at least 75% of the total number of people who work (live) in the area.6 Similar geographic 
definitions can be found in the literature measuring the productivity benefits from agglomeration, 
including the French employment areas (e.g. Combes et al., 2008a; Combes et al., 2007; Combes et 
al., 2008b) and the Italian local labour markets (e.g. Blasio and Di Addario, 2005; Di Addario and 
Patacchini, 2007), both defined on the basis of daily commuting patterns. We base the analysis at the 
level of work TTWA instead of home TTWA on the grounds that this spatial unit is more relevant for 
the analysis of productivity gains from agglomeration economies. 
 The use of a territorial division that approximates labour markets can offer some important 
advantages. In particular, it can reduce the concerns about the endogeneity of agglomeration effects as 
a result of the low labour mobility between labour markets (Di Addario and Patacchini, 2007). In 
addition, labour market areas are well suited to capture the geographic scope within which 
agglomeration externalities take place, in particular those related to labour market pooling and 
knowledge spillovers. On the other hand, these boundaries are less appropriated to capture the spatial 
reach of the agglomeration effects arising from intermediate input-output linkages between firms 
which presumably take place between various labour market areas. 
                                                 
6 We use TTWA as at 1998. For the list of names and codes see: 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/geography/geographic_area_listings/other.asp. 
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Urban agglomeration economies are a function of the concentration of a diversity of activities, 
closely correlated with the size of a given area. These externalities derive from access to specialised 
inputs among diverse firms such as specialised business services, access of firms to public facilities, 
transport systems and other public infrastructure. To represent urban agglomeration externalities we 
therefore use a measure of the employment density of a given TTWA. Density measures have been 
widely used in the literature as a surrogate for external urban economies (e.g. Ciccone and Hall, 1996; 
Ciccone, 2002; Combes et al., 2008a; Combes et al., 2008b; Combes et al., 2007; Mion and 
Naticchioni, 2005). Employment density is simply defined as the ratio of total employment to the total 
land area: 
 
rarea
rtemprtdens = ,                         (8) 
 
where emprt is employment in TTWA area r at time t and arear is the respective land area in square 
kilometres.  
To account for between-labour market interactions we also include a measure of the market 
potential accessible at a given TTWA r, as first introduced by Harris (1954). We follow Combes et al, 
2008a,b and Mion and Naticchioni for this approach, who use a market potential function to capture 
product market  interactions such as those related to input-output linkages. The market potential 
function can proxy for the potential demand for goods and services produced in a given location r 
from all other locations j, taking into account the proximity of each location j to r. We measure market 
potential as below.  
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which is a distance discounted sum of employment of all other locations j where drj is the distance 
between the two locations, measured using the Pythagoras theorem and the x-latitude and y-longitude 
coordinates of each TTWA centroid.  
 To account for the importance from other characteristics of labour markets we include a set of 
controls commonly used in the agglomeration literature, which capture the extent to which labour 
markets are specialised in a one or some industry sectors and the extent to which they exhibit a 
diversified economic structure. To evaluate economic diversity we use an index that measures the 
similarity between the composition of economic activities of a given local economy to that of the 
national economy. The index of relative economic diversity is the inverse of the summed absolute 
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differences between the local and national share of employment in economic sector s. We use the 
formula proposed by Duranton and Puga (2000). 
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where emprst is the employment in industry sector s, TTWA r at time t; empst is the national 
employment in industry sector s at time t; and empt is the total national employment at time t. The 
greater the value of the index the more similar is the composition of economic activities in the local 
and the national economies; the smaller the index the less diversified is the local economy relative to 
the whole economy.  
 We also consider measures that capture within-industry interactions. A simple measure of 
relative specialisation is that proposed by Duranton and Puga (2000), shown below:  
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where the subscripts and variables are as before. In alternative, industrial specialisation can be 
measured with the Hirschmann-Herfindahl index (HHI), defined below. 
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5. Results and discussion 
 
In this section we present and discuss the results from the regression analysis of the wage equation 
below: 
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where the dependent variable is the logarithm of real net hourly earnings, Xit is a vector of individual 
worker characteristics, Yf(i,t) measures the number of workers in the respective firm, and Zr(i)t includes 
the variables that measure agglomeration economies. The remaining terms are dummy variables that 
control for various sources of heterogeneity; we explain the rationale for their inclusion in the model 
specification below. 
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 There are various sources of heterogeneity that if omitted can lead to inconsistency. Perhaps 
the most important source of consistency is workers’ unobserved heterogeneity, which essentially 
captures differences in workers’ ability and education: ηi.  The inclusion of individual-specific effects 
is crucial to account for workers’ unobservable attributes that can influence wage levels. The 
consistency of the model parameter estimates depends to large extent on the assumptions made about 
the behaviour of these effects and the econometric estimators employed.  
 Besides (time-invariant) worker heterogeneity, workers’ wage levels may also be affected by 
firm characteristics such as the wage policy and other unmeasured attributes of firms. It has been 
argued elsewhere that firm size can capture, at least to some extent, firm heterogeneity in productivity 
(see Mion and Naticchioni, 2009). Nevertheless, there will be many other factors across which firms 
can differ regardless of their size, so we also include a set of dummy variables for each firm in the 
wage equation: Ψf(i,t). The firm-specific effects are identified from workers’ mobility across firms and 
capture the portion of wages that is specific to firm f. In this model, the identification of worker and 
firm fixed effects relies on there being at least one worker with at least one job change for each firm.7 
 Since the ASHE does not contain any direct measure of workers’ educational qualifications we 
can not identify the effect on wage from individuals’ skills acquired through education. Nevertheless, 
the ASHE collects data for occupational groups (SOC) up to the 4 digit level, which covers over 350 
unit groups. This is very useful because it can provide a meaningful and detailed characterisation of 
the nature of the job performed by a given worker. Moreover, and in contrast to educational levels, the 
SOC accounts for competences acquired through non-school qualification, training and work 
experience. This means that the SOC can still offer a meaningful way of representing workers’ skills. 
To account for wages differentials related to heterogeneity in workers’ skills as represented by their 
respective occupation, we include dummy variables for the SOC at the one digit level: λo(i,t),.
 Similarly, there may be differences in wage levels of equivalent individuals that work in 
different industries and we wish to net that effect out of the effects from our variables of interest. 
Sectoral heterogeneity is accounted for through inclusion of a set of dummy variables: σs(i,t). To 
account for time-specific events that are shared among all workers, we include a set of year dummies: 
δt. 
 Also of great importance is the fact that inequality of wage levels can reflect spatial differences 
in the cost of living (including land/housing prices), the degree of market competition, etc. In 
particular, living cost tends to exhibit the same kind of positive relationship with agglomeration as 
wages: more agglomerated areas face higher living costs. In fact, one of the theories put forward to 
explain spatial wage differentials is that spatial wage differentials are only nominal and exist to 
                                                 
7 We fit a linear fixed-effects model with worker- and firm-specific effects using the memory saving programme felsdvreg developed by 
Cornelissen, (2008). 
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compensate for higher costs of living. We do not have data for either the cost of living or house prices 
at the level of the TTWAs, and therefore add dummy variables to account for such differences. This 
strategy, however, raises some issues and finally we include dummy variables for the Governmental 
Office Regions (GORs) instead: ωr(i,t). There are two main reasons supporting the option for GOR 
level controls. First, there were identification issues in the estimation of the panel data estimators 
because of multicollinearity between the individual effects and the TTWA dummies. Secondly, for 
many TTWAs inside the same GOR there may actually be no real differences in the average cost of 
living except for the TTWA that corresponds to the core region of the GOR. We acknowledge that this 
option may have some limitations but point out that it does not compromise the consistency of the 
estimates obtained. Finally, εit is the error term and is assumed to be normally distributed while 
allowing for potentially heteroskedasticity and clustering on individuals. 
 
Econometric estimators 
 
We compare the results obtained from various estimators that make very distinct assumptions about 
the correlation between the regressors and both the error term and the individual-specific effects. The 
estimators we use are the pooled OLS (POLS), the between estimator (BE), the random-effects 
estimator (RE), the fixed-effects estimator (FE), the first-differences estimator (FD), the Hausman and 
Taylor (1981) estimator (HT), and the instrumental-variables estimator (IV). Appendix B provides a 
detailed explanation of the statistical estimators used.  
The main distinction between the estimators above concerns their ability to produce consistent 
and unbiased model parameter estimates. In the presence of nonzero correlation between the 
individual specific effects (and hence the error term) and (all) the covariates, only the FE and the FD 
estimators ensure consistency. On the contrary, if the individual-specific effects are uncorrelated with 
the other regressors the pooled OLS and the BE are consistent estimators but are less efficient than the 
RE estimator. While the FE estimator is also consistent in this case, the RE estimator is more efficient 
because it uses both “within-panel” and “between-panel” variation. Furthermore, the FE and the FD 
estimators will not be able to identify the coefficients of time-invariant variables (e.g. gender, 
education).  
To assess the appropriateness of the RE or the FE model we perform the Hausman (1978) test 
of the null hypothesis of no correlation between the individual effects and the regressors; if the test 
fails to reject the null hypothesis the RE model should be preferred on the basis that it produces both 
consistent and efficient estimates of the parameters of the model, otherwise the FE should be preferred 
because it is the only estimator that produces consistent estimates. In addition, we also estimate the 
HT (1981), which, unlike the RE model, produces consistent estimates and, unlike the FE and the FD 
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estimators, identifies the coefficients of time-invariant covariates. Finally, in the presence of reverse 
causality, some form of IV estimator needs to be applied to ensure consistency.  
 In section 5.1 we estimate the main baseline results for the effects from agglomeration 
externalities and investigate the degree to which workers’ and firms’ unobservable attributes affect the 
parameter estimates for agglomeration externalities. In addition, we undertake further regression 
analysis to test for the presence of spatial sorting of workers’ skills across space. Section 5.2 corrects 
for endogeneity from reverse causality between productivity and agglomeration economies through 
instrumental variables estimation. In section 5.3 we examine the spatial decay pattern of 
agglomeration externalities. 
5.1. Bias I: workers’ self-selection  
 
Table 2 reports the results for the whole economy, whereas Table 3 reports the results obtained for 
each of the 13 industry groups of two-digit industries. See Table A1 in Appendix A for a description 
of the economic sectors.  
 The size of the coefficients differs significantly across estimators. Wages increase with 
worker’s age but the increases become smaller as workers become older. The marginal effect of age 
appears to decline with age, suggesting a concave age-earning relationship. This nonlinear relationship 
reflects some sort of diminishing returns of wage rates with respect to age. This can be because at 
early stages of their careers workers have lower wages and hence experience relatively larger increases 
than at later stages of the career where wage levels are higher. Alternatively, it can also reflect the fact 
that as individuals get older they learn new techniques more slowly and are less able to readjust to new 
tasks, resulting in a decline of their productivity levels. Female workers receive on average between -
10% and -20% less than male workers. Full-timers only earn higher hourly wages according to the 
POLS and the BE estimators, while the panel regressions suggest that full-timers can earn hourly 
wages between -6% to -0.7% lower than part-timers.  
The elasticity of wages with respect to firm size shows that doubling the number of employees 
raises wages by around 1.0%; this positive relation between firm size and workers’ earnings can also 
suggest the presence of internal returns to scale. There is also some theoretical reasoning suggestive of 
a positive association between firm productivity and firm size (e.g. Kim, 1989; Helsley and Strange, 
1990). 
The trade-off between longer commute lengths and higher wages is reflected by the coefficient 
of home-to-work distance, which measures the (wage) compensation of commuting. The estimates 
indicate that increasing home-to-work distances by 10% requires compensation in hourly wages 
between about 0.14% and 0.61%, depending on the estimator. Taking the coefficient value from the 
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FE estimator as reference, and knowing that the average commute length (hourly wage rate) is about 
15 kilometres (9 pounds), this means that an additional 150 metres requires a compensation of about 
13 pence (one pound) in hourly (daily) wage rates. One additional kilometre requires compensation in 
hourly earnings of approximately 84 pence.8 
As regards the effect from agglomeration externalities, the results indicate that the magnitude 
of the effects of labour market employment density and market potential on wages is sensitive to the 
estimator used. Controlling for unobserved worker heterogeneity while assuming that there is no 
correlation between individual-specific effects and other regressors, reduces the size of the elasticity of 
hourly wages with respect to employment density (market potential) from 2.2% (10.0%) to 2.0% 
(9.9%). Once we relax the assumption of no correlation between the individual effects and the 
regressors, the elasticity values further reduce to 1.0% (5.4%) respectively. The Hausman test rejects 
the null hypothesis of no correlation between the individual effects and the regressors, implying that 
the RE estimator provides inconsistent estimates and so we should prefer the FE estimator. 
Like the FE, the FD estimator also ensures consistency because it eliminates the individual 
specific effects through the first-differences transformation. The results suggest that an increase of one 
percentage point in the annual growth of employment density (market potential) increases worker’s 
hourly wage growth by about 0.37 (3.63) percentage points.  
The FE estimator assumes that all covariates are correlated with the individual effects, and 
cannot estimate the coefficients of time-invariant regressors. The HT estimator can retrieve the 
coefficients of time-invariant covariates and also allows for nonzero correlation between the individual 
effects and some of the covariates. We fit the HT estimator allowing for nonzero correlation between 
the individual effects and three covariates: home-to-work distance, the proxy for experience (age 
squared), employment density, and market potential. The elasticities of hourly wages with respect to 
employment density and market potential are 1.6% and 10.1% respectively. Nevertheless, the 
Hausman test between the FE and the HT estimates still rejects the null hypothesis and we suspect this 
indicates that here may be other endogeneity issues in our model, namely reverse causality between 
worker productivity and agglomeration.   
So far, the most robust coefficients are those obtained from the FE estimator. Besides 
depending on worker characteristics that affect their productivity (education, ability), wage can also be 
determined by firm characteristics, including firms’ wage policies. Since our dataset has information 
for the enterprise in which workers work, we use the enterprise reference to control for firms’ 
unobservable heterogeneity which should capture for firm (time-invariant) productivity differentials.  
                                                 
8 Evidence for the Netherlands by Rouwendal, (1999) shows a smaller compensation level: on average workers are willing to accept an 
increase of 1 kilometre in commuting distances if there is an increase of 12 (96) cents of a Dutch guilder in hourly (daily) wage rates. 
Converting to pounds (NLG 1= £ 0.39), this means that on average workers are willing to accept commuting one kilometre more if their 
hourly (daily) wages increase by 5 (37) pence.  
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There are 5,814 firm effects identified and 225,103 worker fixed-effects identified in the model 
with worker- and firm-specific fixed-effects. Observation of the parameter estimates of model FE (2) 
reveals that further controlling for time-invariant firm level heterogeneity, besides unobserved time-
invariant worker heterogeneity, appears to impact on the parameter coefficients only slightly. The 
wage elasticity of employment density (market potential) is 0.72% (5.1%) compared to 1.0% (5.4%) 
obtained from the model FE (1), which controls only for unobserved time-invariant worker 
heterogeneity.  
 Beneath the aggregate effect, there is substantial variation by industry group, as shown in 
Table 3. The results presented in the table are for the worker fixed-effects estimation, which according 
to the Hausman tests displayed at the bottom is the only consistent estimator. The effects are positive 
and significant for the renting, information technology, research and development industries, and other 
business activities. The elasticity values for employment density for these industry groups are 1.73% 
and 1.42% respectively. This is consistent with the theory that it is the knowledge and skill intensive 
activities that benefit the most from clustering in denser areas, where the benefits from face-to-face 
communication, access to a skilled workforce, and access to firms that provide complementary 
specialized services are maximised. Nevertheless, it is surprising to find that the effect from labour 
market density is not significant for the financial intermediation sector. One possible explanation for 
the lack of significance may be that this sector is composed of a variety of services (from commercial 
banks to investment banks and insurance) that do now all require being located in dense labour 
markets. The effect is not statistically significant for the remaining services industries, primary 
industries, manufacturing, electricity, gas and water, and construction. 
The importance of access to product markets also differs across industry groups and exhibits a 
pattern distinct from the one outlined for labour market density. The market potential captures the 
importance of proximity to intermediate input suppliers and output costumers. Traditionally, proximity 
to intermediate suppliers of inputs has been of greater importance for manufacturing industries, for 
example the textiles industry. The effects from market potential are positive and significant for 
manufacturing (5.6%), electricity, gas and water (11%), and transport, storage and communication 
(7.8%).   
 If we consider the analysis at the more disaggregated level of two-digit SIC industries 
separately, we observe that increasing returns to labour market size are statistically important for a few 
service industries, in particular the research & development industry (SIC 73) and other business 
activities (SIC 74). Both the research & development and the business activities industries are strongly 
dependent on the availability of skilled workers, who are predominantly located in denser and larger 
labour markets. On the other hand, there is a negative association between labour market density and 
wages for the industries related to the extraction of crude oil and natural gas (SIC 11) and the 
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manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuels (SIC 23). These results are 
reasonable because the location of firms in these sectors, particularly the extraction of crude oil and 
natural gas, is vey much determined by the location of natural resources (crude oil, natural gas, etc.). 
As for the role of access to product markets, the effects are mixed across industries. The effect 
tends to be positive for manufacturing, particularly for the manufacture of pulp, paper and paper 
products (SIC 21), the publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media (SIC 22), the 
manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuels (SIC 23), the manufacture of 
machinery, motor vehicles and other transport equipment (SIC 29, SIC 34, and SIC 35), and also the 
manufacture of furniture (SIC 36). Access to product markets (either intermediate and/or final) also 
appears to be important for the electricity, gas and water supply industry (SIC 40) and some service 
industries: retail trade, repair of personal and household goods (SIC 52), land transport and transport 
via pipelines (SIC 60), and public administration and defence, and compulsory social security (SIC 
75). This suggests that access to a large final demand market may be important to some of the service 
sectors like retail trade and land transport, but also for some manufacturing sectors like the 
manufacture of machinery, motor vehicles and other transport equipment and publishing, printing and 
reproduction of recorded media.  
On the contrary, market potential has a negative importance for the research & development 
industry (SIC 73), which is reasonable given that access to product markets is not the key factor 
affecting this industry’s economic performance. Perhaps less expected is the negative coefficient for 
the importance of market potential for the agriculture, hunting and related service activities (SIC 01), 
the manufacture of wearing apparel, dressing and dyeing of fur, leather, and manufacture of handbags, 
saddlery, harness and footwear (SIC 18 and SIC 19). Despite the perishable nature of many of its 
products, the general reduction in transport costs may have made it less important for agriculture to be 
close to large final demand markets. As for the manufacturing industries SIC 18 and SIC 19, it may be 
that access to cheap labour dominates over access to final product markets.  
 Our baseline results for the effect of labour market scale and market potential indicate that 
doubling the employment density of a given TTWA can raise workers’ hourly wages by no more than 
1%. Halving the distances to other markets increases produces an increase of hourly wages of 2.7%. 
One important aspect of the estimation so far is that accounting for workers’ unobservable 
heterogeneity appears to be important in obtaining a correct estimate for the effects economic scale 
and market potential, whereas accounting for firms’ unobservable characteristics produces only slight 
changes. Worker fixed-effects account for nearly 75% of all variation in wages compared to the less 
that 2% of firm-effects. Controlling for workers’ unobservable heterogeneity produces a reduction of 
about 55% in the size of the effects from labour market scale (from 2.2% to 1.0%) and about 46% in 
the magnitude of the effect from market potential (from 10.0% to 5.4%). Further controlling for firms 
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unobservable characteristics produces wage elasticities of employment density and market potential of 
0.72% and 5.1% respectively. 
 
 
Table 2: Regression results for the whole economy 
Dependent variable: log of real hourly wage POLS BE RE FE (1) FE (2) HT FD 
Log of home-to-work distance 0.0576** 0.0609** 0.0334** 0.0143**  0.0134*** 0.0185** 0.0090** 
Age 0.0387** 0.0348** 0.0475** 0.0429** 0.0418*** 0.0694** 0.0475** 
Age2 -0.0004** -0.0004** -0.0005** -0.0006** -0.0006*** -0.0008** -0.0006** 
Female -0.1198** -0.0996** -0.1668**   -0.1960**  
Full-timer 0.0737** 0.0862** -0.0071** -0.0633** -0.0676*** -0.0350** -0.1017** 
Log of firm size 0.0139** 0.0147** 0.0100** 0.0061** 0.0053*** 0.0083** 0.0048** 
Log of employment density 0.0222** 0.0219** 0.0195** 0.0096** 0.0072*** 0.0161** 0.0037* 
Log of market potential 0.0999** 0.0914** 0.0990** 0.0538** 0.0519*** 0.1072** 0.0363** 
Log of index of economic diversity -0.0515** -0.0568** -0.0313** -0.0092** -0.0082*** -0.0205** 0.0058* 
Log of index of industrial specialisation 0.0012 -0.0008 -0.0010 -0.0064 -0.0042 -0.0053 0.0088 
Log of area 0.0410** 0.0404** 0.0351** 0.0147** 0.0131*** 0.0324** -0.0034 
Observations 657533 657533 657533 657533 655924 657533 384889 
F-statistic 7659.4920 9041.4471  349.7688  3965.1271 232.9263 
Chi2   1.91e+05   1.78e+05  
R2 overall 0.5989 0.5960 0.5855 0.3902    
R2 within  0.0349 0.0633 0.0792 0.1195  0.0515 
R2 between  0.6439 0.6219 0.4170    
Test of individual effects:p-value   **  ***   
Hausman (re vs fe)    66796.81    
p-value    **    
Hausman (fe vs ht)    28977.54    
p-value       **       
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Occupation dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Region dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Worker dummies no no no yes yes no no 
Firm dummies no no no no yes no no 
Standard errors are cluster-robust. Clustering is on workers.  Significance levels: + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. 
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Table 3: Regression results for individual industry groups 
Dependent variable: log of real hourly 
wage Primary Manufacturing 
Electricity, 
gas & 
water 
Construction Wholesale & retail 
Hotels & 
restaurants 
Log of home-to-work distance 0.0086 0.0087** 0.0075+ 0.0082* 0.0072** 0.0029 
Age 0.0180 0.0351** 0.0778** 0.0552** 0.0350** 0.0545** 
Age2 -0.0004** -0.0005** -0.0008** -0.0006** -0.0006** -0.0004** 
Full-timer -0.1778** -0.1292** -0.1351* -0.1917** -0.0437** -0.0632** 
Log of firm size -0.0165 0.0209** -0.0047 0.0088* 0.0020+ -0.0012 
Log of employment density 0.0214 0.0045 -0.0010 0.0072 0.0007 0.0010 
Log of market potential 0.0707 0.0561* 0.1139* 0.0207 0.0427 0.0623 
Log of index of economic diversity -0.0506 0.0025 0.0304+ 0.0139 0.0073 0.0089 
Log of index of industrial specialisation -0.0157 -0.0064 -0.0236 -0.0409 0.0343+ 0.0468 
Log of area -0.0347 -0.0188** -0.0479+ -0.0212 -0.0165+ 0.0155 
Observations 5206 96527 3288 23560 100576 21116 
R2 overall 0.0202 0.1906 0.2158 0.1694 0.0707 0.1088 
R2 within 0.0758 0.0507 0.1141 0.0847 0.0399 0.0574 
R2 between 0.0398 0.1858 0.2404 0.1885 0.0588 0.1231 
Hausman (FE vs RE) 549** 10411** 461** 1460** 10092** 1216** 
Hausman (FE vs HT) 228** 4584** 175** 860** 3807** 449** 
 
Dependent variable: log of real hourly 
wage 
Transport, 
storage & 
communication 
Financial 
intermediation Real estate 
Renting, 
IT,R&D 
Other 
business 
activities 
Public 
services 
Log of home-to-work distance 0.0165** 0.0122** 0.0135+ 0.0150** 0.0096** 0.0069** 
Age 0.0076 0.0753** 0.0513** 0.0678** 0.0808** 0.0396** 
Age2 -0.0002** -0.0009** -0.0005** -0.0007** -0.0008** -0.0005** 
Full-timer -0.1213** -0.0430** -0.0847** -0.1282** -0.0822** -0.1086** 
Log of firm size 0.0102** 0.0052** 0.0088+ 0.0194** 0.0045+ 0.0036** 
Log of employment density 0.0018 0.0081 0.0292 0.0173+ 0.0142* 0.0006 
Log of market potential 0.0780* 0.0170 -0.0750 0.0151 0.0647 0.0025 
Log of index of economic diversity 0.0032 0.0160+ 0.0044 -0.0160 0.0200+ 0.0044 
Log of index of industrial specialisation 0.0489+ 0.0708* -0.0248 -0.0427 -0.0195 -0.0122 
Log of area 0.0036 0.0021 -0.0364 -0.0312 -0.0021 0.0107* 
Observations 42072 36659 8526 19191 54216 223085 
R2 overall 0.1666 0.3283 0.0267 0.2582 0.2104 0.3197 
R2 within 0.0490 0.0643 0.0846 0.0472 0.0738 0.0939 
R2 between 0.1411 0.3672 0.0330 0.2771 0.2148 0.3243 
Hausman (FE vs RE) 4460** 5134** 695** 1608** 5315** 22214** 
Hausman (FE vs HT) 1848** 2017** 311** 870** 2639** 10553** 
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Occupation dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Region dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Worker dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Firm dummies no no no no no no 
Standard errors are cluster-robust. Clustering is on workers.  Significance levels: + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. 
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Workers’ spatial sorting 
 
To investigate the extent to which workers’ unobservable skills sort across space we compute the 
average of worker fixed-effects for (i) high-density (HD) and low-density (LD) labour markets9, and 
(ii) urban and rural areas10. These averages measure percentage wage differences from the overall 
mean of the worker fixed-effects, which equals zero. If there is spatial sorting of workers’ skills 
towards urban and more dense labour markets we should find a positive value for the average of 
workers’ unobservable skills in HD labour markets and urban areas, against a negative value for the 
average of workers’ unobservable skills in LD labour markets and urban areas respectively.  
The average of worker fixed-effects in HD labour markets is 0.0139, compared to the -0.0515 
for workers whose workplace is in LD labour markets. Looking at the urban versus rural workplace 
location, the averages of workers’ unobservable skills are 0.0062 and -0.0383 respectively. This 
indicates that more able individuals work in HD labour markets and urban areas, whereas less able 
individuals work in LD labour markets and rural areas.  
To further inspect the spatial sorting of workers’ unobservable skills we calculate the average 
skill for workers moving workplace area. The averages of workers’ unobservable skills for workers 
moving workplace between LD/rural and HD/urban labour markets/areas are shown in Table 5. We 
observe that the average is negative (positive) for workers moving workplace within low-density 
(high-density) labour markets: the values are-0.025 and 0.048 respectively. The average is positive 
and equal to 0.065 for movers from LD to HD labour markets. This is indicative of a positive spatial 
sorting of workers’ unobservable skills. However, we observe that the average skill of movers from 
HD to LD labour markets is 0.073. This runs in contrary to the spatial sorting argument, but can result 
from the fact that workers can move workplace from a rural area in a HD labour market to an urban 
area in a LD labour market. We therefore calculate the average skill for workers moving between 
urban and rural workplace areas. Table 4 shows the average skill of movers between rural areas (from 
urban-to-rural areas) is negative, whereas the average skill of movers between urban areas (from rural-
to-urban areas) is positive. 
 
Table 4: Average of workers’ unobservable skills by workplace area 
  Low-density  High-density    Rural Urban 
Low-density -0.025 0.065 Rural -0.0062 0.0044 
High-density  0.073 0.048 Urban -0.0023 0.0403 
 
                                                 
9 HD and LD are defined by reference to the mean labour market employment density over the period from 2002 to 2006. Labour 
markets with density values greater (lower) that the mean value are classified as HD (LD). 
10 Workplace postcodes are classified as urban or rural according to the National Statistics Rural and Urban Classification of Output 
Areas. If a given postcode is located in an urban Output Area (OAs), it will be classified as urban, and vice-versa. Output Areas are 
designated as urban or rural depending on their size. For England and Wales, OAs with 10,000 or more people are designated as urban. 
In Scotland, OAs with 3,000 or more people are classified as urban. 
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5.2. Bias II: endogeneity of agglomeration externalities  
 
So far we have considered the bias from endogeneity resulting from nonzero correlation between the 
model covariates and the individual-specific effects, in particular due to workers’ spatial self-selection 
into denser areas. The estimation of agglomeration externalities is also potentially troubled with 
endogeneity bias from reverse causality between wages and agglomeration, as well as reverse 
causality between wages and home-to-work distances.  
 To correct for the simultaneity between agglomeration and workers’ wages we implement 
instrumental variables (IV) techniques, using long-lagged values of the endogenous variables as 
instruments. Such instruments are widely used in the literature and were first employed by Ciccone 
and Hall (1996). The case for instrument exogeneity, as argued by Ciccone and Hall (1996) and 
Combes et al. (2008a,b), consists on the idea that deep time lags of urban densities are correlated with 
current levels of urban densities, but uncorrelated with current levels of productivity. In other words, 
the urban system in the nineteenth century can explain to some extent the distribution of present urban 
densities, but does not explain the distribution of current productivity levels. 
It is more difficult to find a valid instrument for home-to-work commuting distances, 
particularly one available at the worker level. The approach we adopt is to instrument home-to-work 
distance of a given worker i with the average commuting distance (excluding home-to-work distance 
of worker i) of all individuals working is same workplace area as worker i, regardless of where they 
live. The average commuting distance to a given workplace can reflect at least partially the level of 
accessibility to a given area, which itself can determine commuting patterns to the area (e.g. well 
connected areas should have people commuting from longer distances because accessibility is better). 
On the other hand, the average commute length of other individuals working in same area should not 
determine the wage level of worker i, other than for the fact that workers may work in the same 
industry, have similar occupations and skills, etc. 
 In what follows, we discuss the validity of our instruments and their ability to provide unbiased 
instrumental variables estimates.11 There are two conditions that need to be satisfied in order for the 
instruments to be valid. The first condition demands that the instruments be uncorrelated with the error 
term: E[ε|Z] = 0, where Z contains the instruments, Xend contains the endogenous regressor(s) in the 
model, and ε is the error term. The second condition requires that the instruments and the endogenous 
variable be correlated with each other: E[Xend| Z] ≠  0. The stronger the correlation, the better the 
relevance of the instruments and the less biased the parameter estimates will be. The set of instruments 
                                                 
11 We use Stata’s unofficial command xtivreg2, provided by Schaffer, (2007). 
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chosen will only be valid when these two conditions are met (see Bound et al., 1995; Staiger and 
Stock, 1997; Murray, 2006).  
Table 5 presents the results for the whole economy obtained from the IV regressions, while 
Table 6 reports estimates for each of the 13 economic sectors. The difference between model (1) and 
model (2) is that model (1) assumes that home-to-work distance is exogenous, while model (2) treats 
home-to-work distance as endogenous together with employment density and market potential. Where 
possible, we use the two-step feasible efficient generalised method of moments (2SFEGMM) 
estimation because it offers efficiency advantages compared to the traditional two-stage least squares 
(2SLS), due to the use of an optimal weighting scheme in the GMM-IV objective function.  
 
Instrument exogeneity 
 
We complement the discussion of the arguments as to why the instruments we use are good with 
evidence from instrument diagnostic tests for instrument exogeneity. We follow Ciccone and Hall 
(1996), Mion and Naticchioni (2005), and Combes et al. (2008a,b) and use long lags of the 
agglomeration measures to correct for the endogeneity bias from reverse causality between 
productivity and agglomeration. We use data for population as gathered in the Census for 1801, 1831 
and 1851. Our instruments cover a time period post industrial revolution that is already characterised 
by a strong urban presence in the form of industrial towns. On the other hand, the fact that our 
instruments are older than many of the technological innovations (e.g. the advent of the information 
technology and communications “revolution”) and other critical events (e.g. World Wars I and II) that 
impacted on the structure of present economies should, in principle, allow for the presence of 
structural breaks that are important for instrument exogeneity to hold. These claims for exogeneity, 
however, can prove insufficient and require formal testing of instrument exogeneity. 
Unfortunately, there are no data for population or employment in the nineteenth century 
Census at the level of the TTWAs. To obtain long-lagged values of the agglomeration measure for the 
TTWAs, we apportioned the population data in each Registration County (RC) to each TTWA, using 
as weights the share of the total land area of a given TTWA inside a given Registration County.12  
 
carea
jcarea
c
cPOPjPOP ∗=∑ ,                               (14) 
 
                                                 
12 The historic boundary shape files for the English and Welsh Registration Counties and Scottish Administrative Counties are provided 
by the Great Britain Historic GIS Project (Portsmouth University) and are available online from the EDINA UKBORDERS website: 
http://edina.ac.uk/ukborders/. 
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where j and c identify the TTWA and Registration County respectively. After obtaining population 
values for each TTWA we compute the long-lagged values for the two market potential measures. 
 We inspect the Hansen’s J (1982)/Sargan’s (1958) tests for the whole set of instruments 
(Census 1801, 1831, and 1851) and the difference-in-Hansen J/Sargan tests for sub-sets of 
instruments, to test the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the long-lagged instruments. The results for 
instrument exogeneity for the models pooling all industry groups are in agreement with previous 
studies using similar instruments, which generally fail to reject the null hypothesis of instrument 
exogeneity. The null hypothesis of instrument exogeneity for the sectoral models (Table 6) is also 
generally not rejected, with exception for the primary sector, manufacturing, transport, storage and 
communication, and renting, IT, and R&D industries. 
 
Instrument relevance 
 
The first-stage regressions indicate that the instruments for employment density and market potential 
have considerable explanatory power, whereas the instrument for home-to-work distance is rather 
poor. The Shea (1997) partial R-squared (simple partial R-squared) scores a value of 0.30 (0.31) for 
the first stage regression of employment density for both model (1) and model (2). As for market 
potential, the Shea partial R-squared (simple partial R-squared) for model (1) is 0.75 (0.77) and for 
model (2) it is 0.67 (0.77). On the contrary, the Shea partial R-squared and simple partial R-squared of 
the first-stage regression of home-to-work distance scores only a small 0.02 value. The implications of 
a weak instrument, even when the instruments are exogenous, are considerably large losses of 
efficiency. To assess the possible implications, we compare the coefficients obtained from the two IV 
estimations, model (1) and model (2) respectively. 
 With regard to the industry level estimations, the Shea partial R-squared (simple partial R-
squared) measure of instrumental relevance ranges between 0.20 and 0.49 (0.21 and 0.90) for the first 
stage regression of employment density, and between 0.25 and 0.82 (0.73 and 0.89) for the first stage 
regression of market potential. The Shea partial R-squared (simple partial R-squared) for home-to-
work distance ranges between 0.01 and 0.08 (0.01 and 0.23). 
To further inspect the relevance of the instruments we perform tests of under identification that 
test whether the model is identified, where identification requires that the excluded instruments be 
correlated with the endogenous regressors. If the instruments are uncorrelated with the endogenous 
regressor, the matrix of reduced form coefficients is not of full rank and the model will be unidentified 
(see Baum et al., 2007). The usual tests are the Anderson (1951) Lagrange Multiplier (LM) and the 
Cragg and Donald (1993) Wald statistics. However, these statistics will not be valid when the 
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) error structure assumption is relaxed to allow for 
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heteroskedasticity and intra-group correlation. In this case, the relevant tests are the LM and Wald 
Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rank statistics. The null hypothesis is that the matrix of reduced form 
coefficients is under identified and a failure to reject the null hypothesis means that the instrumental 
variables bias of the parameter estimates will be increased. The values presented in Table 5 and Table 
6 show that both tests reject the null of under-identification, implying that the instruments are relevant.  
 In addition, we test for the presence of weak instruments. Weak identification is present when 
the excluded instruments are correlated with the endogenous regressor, but only poorly. In this case 
the estimators can perform badly and one is advised to use more robust estimators such as the limited 
information maximum likelihood (LIML) estimator (see Hahn and Hausman, 2003; Baum et al., 
2007). Under i.i.d. errors the relevant test is the F-statistic version of the Cragg-Donald Wald test 
statistic. Where possible, we use the Kleibergen-Paap (2006) Wald rank F statistic that is valid for 
estimation that is robust to heteroskedastic and clustered error structures. The critical values for this 
test are from Stock and Yogo (2005) and are shown in the notes section of Table 5 and Table 6 The 
Kleibergen-Paap (2006) Wald rank F statistic for weak identification reported in Table 5 is higher than 
the Stock and Yogo (2005) critical values, suggesting that our instruments are not weak. The Cragg-
Donald F-statistic shown in Table 6 for the sectoral regressions also tends to exceed the critical values 
for the weak identification tests. The only exception is model (2) for the real estate sector. 
 Since the critical values are for the case of i.i.d error structures, we also perform tests that are 
robust to the presence of weak instruments: the Anderson-Rubin (1949) Wald and F statistics tests and 
the Stock-Wright (2000) S statistic test. These are tests of the significance of the endogenous 
regressors in the structural model with the null hypothesis and are specified in an equivalent way as to 
testing for the joint significance of the excluded instruments in the reduced form of he model. If we 
reject the null that the coefficients of the excluded instruments in the reduced form equation are equal 
to zero, we also reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the endogenous regressors in the 
structural model are equal to zero (Baum et al., 2007, p. 25). The results reported in Table 5 show that 
the null hypothesis is rejected and so we conclude that the instruments are relevant. As for the sectoral 
regressions, the test statistics shown in Table 6 sometimes fail to reject the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients of the instruments and the coefficients of the endogenous regressors are jointly equal to 
zero (construction, hotels and restaurants, financial intermediation, other business activities, and 
public services).  
 Taken together, the results for the IV estimations generally indicate that our instruments can 
effectively be treated as exogenous. The estimate for the wage elasticity of employment density 
obtained from model (1) (model (2)) is 0.8% (0.7%). This is about 20% smaller than the elasticity 
value obtained with the FE estimator (1.0%), and about 64% smaller than the elasticity value obtained 
with the pooled OLS estimate (2.2%). As for the effect of market potential, the instrumental variables 
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estimator for model (1) (model (2)) proposes that doubling the size of the market potential increases 
hourly wages by 5.8% (4.3%), in contrast to the 5.4% (10.0%) obtained with the FE (POLS) estimator. 
Finally, the compensation for additional commuting also differs considerably across estimators. 
Treating home-to-work distance as endogenous (exogenous) reduces the size of the coefficient from 
5.8% (POLS)/1.4% (FE) to 3.3% (1.4%).13  
Comparing the pooled OLS estimates with the instrumental variables estimates we observe that 
the elasticities of employment density and market potential are revised downwards. This is intuitive 
because of the positive association between the measures of agglomeration and workers’ unobservable 
skills, which in our models account for differences in years of education and other unobserved 
productive abilities.  
When we compare the instrumental variables estimates for agglomeration externalities with 
those obtained from the FE estimator, we find that correcting for endogeneity of agglomeration revises 
the size of the elasticity of employment density (market potential) downwards (upwards) if model (1) 
is taken as the reference case; both elasticity values are revised downwards is model (2) is taken as the 
reference case. It is not straight forward to propose a theory for why the direction of bias of the FE 
estimates is positive for employment density and negative for market potential. Both the FE model and 
the IV model are in theory cleaned from workers’ unobserved heterogeneity, so the bias in the FE 
estimations should result purely from nonzero correlation between the idiosyncratic error term and the 
model covariates.  
 Considering the results for the sectoral models with valid instruments, we observe that labour 
market density has a positive impact of wages for the other business activities sector (1.52%) and a 
negative effect for the wholesale and retail sector. The effect from access to product markets is 
significant and positive only for the wholesale and retail sector.  
 The following paragraphs summarise the results up to this point. Our findings are consistent 
with previous evidence from worker-level longitudinal wage functions that also deal with workers’ 
unobservable heterogeneity and reverse causality between productivity and agglomeration. We 
improve on these models by also estimating the wage compensation of commute distances and 
attempting to correct for its endogenous nature, together with agglomeration economies. 
Combes et al. (2008a,b) estimate elasticities of wages with respect to employment density 
(market potential) of about 3% (2%) for French employment areas. Mion and Naticchioni (2005) 
estimate somewhat weaker elasticity of wages with respect to employment density (0.22%), but 
similar size elasticity of wages with respect to market potential (3.19%), for the Italian Provinces. 
Looking at Travel-to-Work Areas (best available approximations to labour markets) in Great Britain, 
                                                 
13 Fitting the instrumental variables estimator to the worker-firm two-way error components model makes very little difference to the 
parameter estimates obtained from the worker fixed-effects instrumental variables estimation; the wage elasticity of employment density 
(market potential) is 0.71% (5.1%) compared to 0.79% (5.78%) respectively. 
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we obtain elasticities of wages with respect to employment density (market potential) of about 0.8% 
(5.8%).  
We conclude that controlling for worker-specific unobservable heterogeneity and correcting 
for reverse causality between earnings and agglomeration are both important to reduce bias in the 
estimates of the effects from labour market size and market potential. Controlling for worker-specific 
unobservable heterogeneity halves the size of the elasticity of employment density, while correcting 
for simultaneity endogeneity further reduces the effect by more than one-fifth. As regards the effect 
from market potential, controlling for worker-specific unobservable heterogeneity nearly halves the 
elasticity value (45%), while correcting for simultaneity endogeneity produces a slight increase of 
about 7%.  
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Table 5: Instrumental variables regressions for the whole economy 
Dependent variable: log of real hourly wage model (1) model (2) 
Log of home-to-work distance 0.0143** 0.0330** 
Age 0.0429** 0.0426** 
Age2 -0.0006** -0.0006** 
Full-timer -0.0633** -0.0638** 
Log of firm size 0.0060** 0.0054** 
Log of employment density 0.0079** 0.0067* 
Log of market potential 0.0578** 0.0431** 
Log of index of industrial specialisation -0.0049 -0.0067 
Log of index of economic diversity -0.0074+ -0.0080+ 
Log of area 0.0150** 0.0117** 
Instrument Exogeneity     
Hansen J stat  (overidentification test of all instruments) 4.9384 4.9142 
Hansen J stat (p-value) 0.2937 0.2962 
Instruments Relevance   
F stat (test of excluded instruments): log of density 2078*** 1775.04*** 
Shea partial R2: log of density 0.3046 0.3025 
partial R2: log of density 0.3141 0.3171 
F stat (test of excluded instruments): log of MP 11921.04*** 10271.84*** 
Shea partial R2: log of MP 0.7466 0.667 
partial R2: log of MP 0.7698 0.7725 
F stat (test of excluded instruments): log of home-work distance  376.29*** 
Shea partial R2: log of home-work distance  0.0181 
partial R2: log of home-work distance  0.0211 
(1) Under-identification tests   
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 4226.97*** 2315.03*** 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald statistic 10528.91*** 2504.56*** 
(2) Weak identification tests   
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic a 1754.67 357.76 
(3) Weak-instrument-robust inference   
Anderson-Rubin Wald test 7.31*** 18.56*** 
Anderson-Rubin Wald test 43.87*** 129.93*** 
Stock-Wright LM S statistic 43.58*** 129.08*** 
Observations 605359 605359 
RMSE 0.1637 0.1637 
R2 centered 0.0792 0.0754 
Time, occupation, industry, region and worker dummies yes yes 
Firm dummies no no 
Standard errors are cluster-robust. Clustering is on workers. Significance levels: + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01  
Notes: first-stage F-stat cluster-robust; Under identification, weak identification and weak-identification-robust test statistics cluster-
robust; Anderson-Rubin stat cluster-robust. 
a Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values (Source: Stock and Yogo (2005)).  
 5% maximal IV relative bias  15.72 13.95 
10% maximal IV size           21.68  
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Table 6: Instrumental variables regressions for individual industry groups 
Primary Manufacturing Electricity, gas & water Construction Wholesale & retail Hotels & restaurants 
Dependent variable: log of real hourly wage 
model (1) model (2) model (1) model (2) model (1) model (2) model (1) model (2) model (1) model (2) model (1) model (2) 
Log of home-to-work distance 0.0086 -0.0968 0.0086** 0.0479** 0.0076+ -0.0008 0.0082** 0.0047 0.0075** 0.0150 0.0031 -0.0101 
Age 0.0183 -0.0063 0.0353** 0.0352** 0.0777** 0.0903** 0.0552** 0.0786** 0.0349** 0.0311** 0.0541** 0.0270 
Age2 -0.0004** -0.0006** -0.0005** -0.0005** -0.0008** -0.0009** -0.0006** -0.0006** -0.0006** -0.0006** -0.0004** -0.0004** 
Full-timer -0.1780** -0.2442** -0.1292** -0.1317** -0.1351** -0.1215** -0.1916** -0.1699** -0.0438** -0.0420** -0.0633** -0.0635** 
Log of firm size -0.0161* -0.0453* 0.0210** 0.0184** -0.0047 -0.0082 0.0089** 0.0100* 0.0021** 0.0011 -0.0012 -0.0034 
Log of employment density 0.0334 -0.1681 -0.0080 -0.0009 0.0205 0.0235 0.0055 0.0077 -0.0103+ -0.0166* -0.0179 0.0187 
Log of market potential 0.0030 1.2444 0.0735** 0.0187 0.0835 0.1947 0.0393 0.0586 0.0535* 0.0704** 0.0561 0.0013 
Log of index of industrial specialisation -0.0184 0.0975 -0.0037 -0.0200 -0.0208 -0.0037 -0.0344 -0.0267 0.0386* 0.0493** 0.0433 0.0484 
Log of index of economic diversity -0.0464 -0.0699 -0.0105 -0.0059 -0.0839** -0.1305** -0.0199 -0.0134 -0.0086 -0.0011 0.0285 0.0151 
Log of area -0.0497+ -0.1914** 0.0044 0.0014 0.0372* 0.0770** 0.0159+ 0.0157 0.0089+ 0.0036 0.0108 -0.0143 
Instrument Exogeneity             
Sargan test statistic 10.502 9.732 17.39 22.338 1.122 6.129 3.323 6.502 11.153 3.133 7.524 4.311 
Sargan p-value 0.0328 0.0452 0.0016 0.0002 0.8907 0.1897 0.5052 0.1646 0.0249 0.5358 0.1107 0.3655 
Instrument Relevance             
Shea partial R2: log of density 0.23 0.2718 0.2338 0.2279 0.4028 0.4908 0.2967 0.2832 0.3187 0.2859 0.3433 0.3404 
partial R2: log of density 0.3528 0.8975 0.2672 0.2644 0.4317 0.5186 0.3067 0.2861 0.3207 0.3148 0.3464 0.3537 
F stat (test of excluded instruments): log of MP 275.51 1244.84 3748.71 2857.51 255.42 222.83 979.85 449.06 4487.9 3248.18 812.92 366.48 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0000 
Shea partial R2: log of MP 0.5395 0.2537 0.6394 0.5199 0.6919 0.3615 0.7191 0.7303 0.7636 0.7463 0.7987 0.6549 
partial R2: log of MP 0.8276 0.8917 0.7306 0.7415 0.7416 0.7495 0.7432 0.747 0.7685 0.7709 0.8059 0.8037 
F stat (test of excluded instruments): log of MP 2426.58 1170.6 27885.92 22802.7 964.97 618.86 6411.77 3308.45 31544.58 23793.07 6367.99 2741.73 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0000 
Shea partial R2: log of home-work distance  0.0775  0.0185  0.0508  0.0297  0.0203  0.0298 
partial R2: log of home-work distance  0.23  0.0232  0.102  0.0304  0.0228  0.0382 
F stat (test of excluded instruments): log of home-work distance  42.47  188.52  23.5  35.15  164.65  26.57 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.0000 
(1) Under-identification tests             
Anderson canon. corr. likelihood ratio stat. 694.8 79.72 14071.38 1028.86 801.59 74.78 3871.02 234.11 17957.26 1003.51 3134.51 140.62 
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p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Cragg-Donald stat. 898.22 86.42 18226.26 1048.22 1315.47 78.75 5455.54 241.28 26203.4 1024.26 4744.28 144.93 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(2) Weak identification tests 
            
Cragg-Donald F- tata 147.95 11.94 3035.94 149.65 215.5 10.98 906.8 34.31 4364.48 146.22 787.63 20.55 
(3) Weak-instrument-robust inference             
Anderson-Rubin test F stat 2.0419 2.00 4.6889 8.7301 0.9099 1.7323 0.7829 1.1567 3.3158 2.6505 1.6912 0.7169 
p-value 0.0569 0.0527 0.0001 0.000 0.4866 0.0974 0.5831 0.3243 0.0029 0.0097 0.1187 0.6577 
Anderson-Rubin test -Chi2 12.3970 14.4565 28.1499 61.1502 5.5544 12.4189 4.7104 8.1339 19.9072 18.5671 10.1869 5.0569 
p-value 0.0537 0.0436 0.0001 0.000 0.4749 0.0876 0.5815 0.3209 0.0029 0.0097 0.117 0.653 
Stock-Wright LM S statistic 12.35 14.26 28.14 61.08 5.54 12.32 4.71 8.13 19.9 18.56 10.18 5.05 
p-value 0.0547 0.0468 0.0001 0.000 0.4767 0.0906 0.5817 0.3217 0.0029 0.0097 0.1174 0.6537 
Observations 4399 1544 87071 79049 2874.0000 2127 19608 11925 83726 73579 14346 7600 
R2 centered 0.0756 0.1040 0.0504 0.0353 0.1118 0.1518 0.0846 0.1021 0.0397 0.0412 0.0568 0.0570 
RMSE 0.1450 0.1633 0.1295 0.1290 0.1219 0.1187 0.1653 0.1579 0.1571 0.1551 0.1658 0.1650 
Significance levels: + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Models include dummies for years, occupations, regions, and workers.       
a Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values (Source: Stock and Yogo (2005).   
 5% maximal IV relative bias  15.72 13.95 15.72 13.95 15.72 13.95 15.72 13.95 15.72 13.95 15.72 13.95        
10% maximal IV relative bias  9.48 8.5 9.48 8.5 9.48 8.5 9.48 8.5 9.48 8.5 9.48 8.5        
20% maximal IV relative bias  6.08 5.56 6.08 5.56 6.08 5.56 6.08 5.56 6.08 5.56 6.08 5.56        
30% maximal IV relative bias  4.78 4.44 4.78 4.44 4.78 4.44 4.78 4.44 4.78 4.44 4.78 4.44        
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Table 6: Instrumental variables regressions for individual industry groups (continued) 
 
Transport, storage & 
communication 
Financial 
intermediation Real estate Renting, IT,R&D 
Other business 
activities Public services Dependent variable: log of real hourly wage 
model (1) model (2) model (1) model (2) model (1) model (2) model (1) model (2) model (1) model (2) model (1) model (2) 
Log of home-to-work distance 0.0165** 0.0349** 0.0124** -0.0111 0.0138** 0.0894 0.0148** 0.0646** 0.0097** 0.0422+ 0.0068** 0.0245** 
Age 0.0074 0.0099 0.0751** 0.0787** 0.0508** 0.0543* 0.0674** 0.0755** 0.0807** 0.0764** 0.0396** 0.0383** 
Age2 -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0009** -0.0009** -0.0005** -0.0007** -0.0007** -0.0007** -0.0008** -0.0008** -0.0005** -0.0005** 
Full-timer -0.1213** -0.0941** -0.0429** -0.0475** -0.0848** -0.0875** -0.1279** -0.1201** -0.0822** -0.0778** -0.1086** -0.1104** 
Log of firm size 0.0102** 0.0107** 0.0051** 0.0044** 0.0088** 0.0065 0.0194** 0.0024 0.0045** 0.0022 0.0036** 0.0028** 
Log of employment density -0.0013 0.0000 -0.0083 -0.0136 0.0087 0.1753** 0.0360** 0.0717** 0.0152* 0.0053 0.0034 0.0050 
Log of market potential 0.1108** 0.1089** 0.0714* 0.1298** -0.1301 -0.3390 0.0382 -0.0046 0.0357 -0.0084 0.0168 -0.0031 
Log of index of industrial specialisation 0.0597* 0.0676* 0.0965** 0.0887* -0.0271 -0.1113 -0.0366 -0.0717 -0.0290 -0.0284 -0.0091 -0.0142 
Log of index of economic diversity 0.0049 0.0027 0.0169 0.0019 -0.0196 -0.0864+ -0.0421* -0.0441* -0.0025 0.0109 0.0077 0.0043 
Log of area 0.0080 0.0073 0.0197** 0.0276** -0.0060 -0.0534 -0.0152 -0.0165 0.0164* 0.0054 0.0059* 0.0032 
Instrument Exogeneity             
Sargan test statistic 10.733 12.526 5.306 1.804 14.85 2.114 25.716 17.325 4.621 2.836 5.76 10.886 
Sargan p-value 0.0297 0.0138 0.2573 0.7717 0.005 0.7148 0.0000 0.0017 0.3284 0.5857 0.2178 0.0279 
Instrument Relevance                  
Shea partial R2: log of density 0.3351 0.3456 0.2756 0.3251 0.2895 0.2001 0.4488 0.3193 0.4011 0.385 0.2798 0.2852      
partial R2: log of density 0.3492 0.3667 0.2848 0.3372 0.2928 0.2074 0.4522 0.4902 0.4175 0.4327 0.2891 0.2942      
F stat (test of excluded instruments): log of MP 2363.65 1780.46 1532.36 1449.6 316.98 76.83 1540.67 1093.81 3283.08 2385.89 10109.93 8330.38      
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000      
Shea partial R2: log of MP 0.7688 0.7795 0.7276 0.7282 0.7458 0.4857 0.8235 0.7035 0.7338 0.6079 0.7397 0.6393      
partial R2: log of MP 0.8009 0.8182 0.7518 0.7668 0.7544 0.8221 0.8296 0.8512 0.7638 0.7674 0.7644 0.7618      
F stat (test of excluded instruments): log of MP 17726.13 13835.5 11658.23 9364.96 2351.71 1356.82 9088.01 6505.47 14812.28 10320.21 80665.83 63894.98      
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000      
Shea partial R2: log of home-work distance  0.0287  0.0558  0.0111  0.0197  0.0068  0.0165      
partial R2: log of home-work distance  0.0296  0.058  0.0191  0.0323  0.0092  0.0191      
F stat (test of excluded instruments): log of home-work distance  93.78  175.53  5.73  37.98  29.16  389.87      
p-value  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000      
(1) Under-identification tests                  
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Anderson canon. corr. likelihood ratio stat. 8679.76 618.05 6133.17 1115.57 1325.07 23.13 5008.26 155.29 10761.56 148.89 40355.34 2300.63      
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000      
Cragg-Donald stat. 12914.32 636.29 8346.41 1181.55 1856.67 23.38 9035.83 158.36 17674.23 149.9 55319.3 2339.09      
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000      
(2) Weak identification tests 
                 
Cragg-Donald F stata 2149.46 90.75 1388.9 168.49 307.1 3.29 1501.15 22.52 2941.85 21.38 9217.66 334.07      
(3) Weak-instrument-robust inference                  
Anderson-Rubin test –F stat 4.4895 5.1636 1.7107 2.1577 2.7871 1.8055 6.4623 6.2196 1.8883 1.0760 1.4717 4.0283      
p-value 0.0001 0.000 0.114 0.0347 0.0105 0.0821 0.000 0.000 0.0787 0.3757 0.1834 0.0002      
Anderson-Rubin test -Chi2 26.9735 36.2059 10.2802 15.1308 16.8499 12.8476 38.8984 43.7344 11.3449 7.5441 8.8325 28.2053      
p-value 0.0001 0.000 0.1133 0.0344 0.0099 0.0759 0.000 0.000 0.0783 0.3745 0.1832 0.0002      
Stock-Wright LM S statistic 26.95 36.15 10.28 15.12 16.79 12.77 38.76 43.5 11.34 7.54 8.83 28.2      
p-value 0.0001 0.000 0.1135 0.0345 0.0101 0.0779 0.000 0.000 0.0784 0.3747 0.1833 0.0002      
Observations 37341 30752 32401 28393 6858 3224 16244 11727 40801 32970 206767 195030      
R2 centered 0.0489 0.0396 0.0637 0.0589 0.0840 0.0564 0.0465 0.0032 0.0737 0.0720 0.0939 0.0911      
RMSE 0.1454 0.1404 0.1572 0.1548 0.1542 0.1333 0.1732 0.1648 0.1684 0.1620 0.1503 0.1493      
Significance levels: + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Models include dummies for years, occupations, regions, and workers.     
a Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values (Source: Stock and Yogo (2005).   
 5% maximal IV relative bias  15.72 13.95 15.72 13.95 15.72 13.95 15.72 13.95 15.72 13.95 15.72 13.95      
10% maximal IV relative bias  9.48 8.5 9.48 8.5 9.48 8.5 9.48 8.5 9.48 8.5 9.48 8.5      
20% maximal IV relative bias  6.08 5.56 6.08 5.56 6.08 5.56 6.08 5.56 6.08 5.56 6.08 5.56      
30% maximal IV relative bias  4.78 4.44 4.78 4.44 4.78 4.44 4.78 4.44 4.78 4.44 4.78 4.44      
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5.3. The spatial decay of agglomeration externalities 
 
One of the key points emerging from previous research (and our own research so far) is the 
insufficient understanding of the pattern of spatial decay of agglomeration economies. Generally, the 
measurement strategies used make two important assumptions for the geographic scope of 
agglomeration externalities. First, they tend to assume that all agents in one given jurisdiction enjoy 
the same level of benefits from concentration of economic activity, that is, there is no decay in the 
intensity of the benefits with increasing distance from its source. Second, the spatial reach of these 
effects is constrained to the borders of the geographic units used by researchers and so, by definition, 
there is no scope for spatial spillovers. In this chapter we undertake further analysis with the goal of 
improving the current understanding of the geographic scope of agglomeration externalities.  
In this section we adopt a strategy similar to that used by Rosenthal and Strange (2008) to 
estimate the spatial attenuation of agglomeration externalities. This method allows for the 
identification of both the geographic scope and the pattern of spatial decay of the effects from 
agglomeration externalities. The pattern of spatial decay can be inferred from the statistical 
significance and size of the coefficients for the effect of the proximity to jobs in the various concentric 
distance bands around the centroid of each worker’s workplace ward. The model to be estimated can 
be written as shown below: 
 
itεiηt)s(i,σt)o(i,λtδ
k
itk,.empkαβitX0αitlnw ++++++++= ∑ )t,i(rω ,                                        (15) 
 
where the variables are as before and the k identifies the successive concentric distance ring, and 
empk,it measures the number of jobs within each concentric ring k, which is defined as follows: 
 
∑ ≠=
i
ji         t),q(j,(k).empijwitk,emp ,               (16) 
 
with empq(j,t) the number of jobs in worker’s j ward at time t. wij(k) is a binary weight that takes value 
zero or one, depending on whether the bilateral distance between any two wards is within certain 
lower and upper thresholds, defined below.  
 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧
≤<−=
otherwise0    
(k)ijdijd1)(kijd if   1 (k)ijw                           (17) 
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with dij(k) the distance in kilometres between the wards of workers i and j, where dij(0)=0. The general 
definition of dij(k) we chose is defined below. 
 
⎩⎨
⎧
=
==
8 (1) 5k    for    kilometres100  (25) 25 
4 (1) 1k    for          kilometres 25 (5) 5 
(k)ijd                        (18) 
 
There is no definite guideline on what a unique spatial regime should be. In choosing our concentric 
rings we try to be parsimonious in the number of rings, while providing a comprehensive definition of 
the overall spatial coverage and the individual distance intervals.  In particular we wish to include 
distance bands that go beyond the average radius of the TTWAs (about 16 kilometres), so that we can 
test for the presence of spatial spillovers outside labour markets.  
To build the measures of economic mass, we use data on yearly employment for the 2001 CAS 
wards, available from the Annual Business Inquiry (ABI) employee analysis. Data for employment at 
the Census Area Statistics ward level is only consistently available from 2003 onward, which limits 
the current analysis to the years between 2003 and 2006 instead of 2002 and 2006. For each worker’s 
workplace Census Area Statistic (CAS) wards (referred to as wards throughout the text for simplicity) 
we construct concentric rings of various radii away from that ward that measure the number of jobs 
inside each respective ring. 
It is worth noting some comments on the differences to previous measurement strategies. Di 
Addario and Patacchini (2007) base the concentric rings around the centroid of the worker’s area of 
residence instead of the workplace area. Moreover, they use local labour markets (LLM) as spatial 
units, which are considerably larger than the areas used by Rosenthal and Strange (2008) and the areas 
used here. Considering that the LLM can be approximated by circles, the average radius is 16.8 
kilometres, which in turn corresponds to an average area of 282.24 square kilometres.  
 There are 10,071 wards in Great Britain compared to the 297 TTWAs. Compared to the 
TTWAs the wards are therefore much smaller areas. Assuming that both geographies can be 
approximated by a circle, the mean and median area size (radius) of the wards is 23 square kilometres 
(2.7 kilometres) and 5 square kilometres (1.3 kilometres) respectively, against the 772.6 square 
kilometres (15.7 kilometres) and 600.5 square kilometres (13.8 kilometres) of the TTWA. The 
geographic units used by Di Addario and Patacchini (2007) are more in line with our TTWAs, which 
we believe are too large to provide a in-depth understanding of the process of spatial decay of 
agglomeration externalities. 
 Table 7 shows the results for the FE estimator using the various distance rings. The Table 
shows that a 100,000 increase in the number of jobs within 5 kilometres raises wages by 
approximately 1.19% and the effect falls sharply by to 0.38% 5 kilometres away (5-10 kilometres) and 
to 0.15% another 5 kilometres away (10-15 kilometres). The size of the effects remains about 0.15% 
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for the 15-20 kilometres band but becomes insignificant between 20-25 kilometres. This suggests that 
the effects from agglomeration externalities are likely to take place within labour markets boundaries 
(the average radius is 16 kilometres). Further analysis of the results reported in Table 8 shows that 
between-labour market area effects are also at place. In fact, while the effects from agglomeration 
externalities appear not to be significant for the 20 to 25 kilometres band, they reappear as significant 
for the 25 to 50 and 50 to 75 kilometres bands. An increase of 100,000 jobs within 25-50 km and 50-
75 km raises wages by 0.11% (0.05%). The estimates are not statistically significant beyond 75 
kilometres. 
 This is a very interesting finding, in particular if related to the spatial scale of the traditional 
Marshallian drivers of agglomeration economies mentioned in section 3.1. The effects from the 
economic mechanisms outlined therein operate over different spatial ranges (see Rosenthal and 
Strange, 2001; Forni and Paba, 2002; Combes et al., 2008b; Rosenthal and Strange, 2006; Combes et 
al., 2008a). Labour market pooling externalities are determined by the size of interactions at the labour 
market level, which is defined for the most part by the extent of daily commuting trips. By contrast, 
productivity effects from access to markets for final and intermediate products are likely to occur over 
longer distance ranges, and therefore are likely to display a spatial scale larger than a local labour 
market. Knowledge spillovers tend to be much localised in very short distance ranges and decay 
rapidly with increased distance.  
  
Table 7: Regression results for the spatial decay of agglomeration externalities 
%change in wage from +100,000 jobs 
Employment 0-5 km 1.19** 
Employment 5-10 km 0.38** 
Employment 10-15 km 0.15* 
Employment 15-20 km 0.16* 
Employment 20-25 km 0.07 
Employment 25-50 km 0.11** 
Employment 50-75 km 0.05** 
Employment 75-100 km 0.01 
Observations 542153 
F-statistic 232.41 
R2 overall 0.42 
R2 within 0.07 
R2 between 0.44 
Hausman (FE vs RE) 12795** 
Time dummies yes 
Occupation dummies yes 
Industry dummies yes 
Region dummies yes 
Worker dummies yes 
Firm dummies no 
Standard errors are cluster-robust. Clustering is on workers. Significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. 
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Compared to our findings, Di Addario and Patacchini (2007) find smaller effects for an additional 
100,000 inhabitants. The increase in wages within 4 kilometres is about 0.1%, but falls to 0.04% 
(0.02%) in the 4-8 (8-12) kilometres proximity band, and becomes insignificant beyond 12 kilometres. 
Rosenthal and Strange (2008) estimate that the effect of employment concentration falls rapidly with 
distance: adding 100,000 full-time workers within 5 miles increase wages by about 2%, while the 
effect falls to 0.5% for the 5-25 miles ring. The main conclusion is that the great part of the spillover 
effects of agglomeration of employment takes place within 5 miles (about 8 kilometres), but it can 
reach as far as 50 miles (nearly 81 km). 
In light of the above considerations, the finding that the spillover effects from agglomeration 
externalities are likely to occur within labour markets (the TTWAs) is believed to be a reasonable 
result.  On the other hand, the significant effects for the 25 to 50 and 50 to 75 kilometres bands can 
reflect the spatial scale of input sharing externalities, while the non-significant gap between 20 and 25 
kilometres may result from the presence of undeveloped land around urban areas resulting from green 
belt land use planning policy which limits urbanisation. Interestingly, our evidence also suggests that 
distance decay may be lumpy, that is, the effects from agglomeration externalities do not decay 
continuously with increasing distance. 
 Finally, it is important to think about the possible implications from our findings to transport 
policy. Knowledge about the pattern of spatial decay of the effects from agglomeration economies can 
be important for the appraisal of transport schemes. Given that transport networks alter the distribution 
of spatial concentration of economic activities, reflected in measures of employment density and 
market potential, our evidence can help the decision about the area of influence for a scheme by 
offering a “boundary” for the scope of the effects from agglomeration. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This paper investigates the role of agglomeration externalities on individual worker’s hourly wages. It 
plays particular attention to effect from labour market scale and access to product markets as 
approximated by a market potential type function. The empirical analyses performed allow controlling 
not only for the effects from unobserved worker heterogeneity, but also for the effects from firm 
unobserved heterogeneity.  
We find that worker unobserved heterogeneity plays a very important role in the explanation of 
spatial wage disparities, whereas firm unobserved heterogeneity has only a slight impact on the 
magnitude of the parameter estimates. Controlling for worker unobserved heterogeneity can halve the 
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size of the wage elasticity of agglomeration externalities. Our findings also support the presence of 
positive sorting of workers across space: more able workers tend to work on urban areas and more 
agglomerated labour markets. 
The paper also devotes considerable attention to the issue of reverse causality. It deals both 
with simultaneity between wages and agglomeration, and between wages and home-to-work 
commutes. Compared to worker unobserved heterogeneity, correcting for simultaneity bias appears to 
have only a minor impact on the size of the parameter estimates. Our best estimate for the effect of 
labour market density (market potential) is 0.8% (5.8%). This means that doubling labour market’s 
employment density can raise hourly earnings by nearly 1%, while halving the distances to other 
markets produces an increase of hourly wages of nearly 3%.  
The last piece of evidence refers to the spatial attenuation of agglomeration externalities. We 
test for the effect of proximity to jobs using concentric distance bands around the centroid of each 
worker’s workplace ward. The findings propose that a 100,000 increase in the number of jobs within 5 
kilometres raises hourly wages by approximately 1.19%; this effect falls sharply (0.38%) if the 
increase in the number of jobs occurs 10 kilometres away, and remains around 0.15% if the increase in 
the number of jobs occurs between 10 to 20 kilometres.  
The sharp decay of agglomeration externalities suggests that the concentration of economic 
activity is important. Nevertheless, its importance may vary with economic sector as suggested by the 
differences in the size of the effects from labour market scale and access to product markets across 
industry groups. This is a topic for future research, which will explore the spatial attenuation of the 
effects from the main mechanisms determining agglomeration for the different sectors of the economy. 
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Appendix A 
 
Table A1: List of industry groups included in the analysis 
Two-digit SIC 
codes Description 
SIC 1-14 Primary industries 
SIC 15-37 Manufacturing 
SIC 40-41 Electricity, gas, and water supply  
SIC 45 Construction  
SIC 50-52 Wholesale & retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal and household goods  
SIC 55 Hotels and restaurants  
SIC 60-64 Transport, storage and communication 
SIC 65-67 Financial intermediation  
SIC 70 Real estate activities 
SIC 71-73 Renting of machinery and equipment; computer and related activities; research and development 
SIC 74 Other business activities 
SIC 75-85 Public administration and defence; compulsory social security; education; health and social work 
Source: ONS. UK Standard Industrial Classification of Economic Activities 2003.  
Available at: http://www.statistics.gov.uk/methods_quality/sic/downloads/UK_SIC_Vol1(2003).pdf 
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